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Abstract
Over the past decades, rapidly changing circumstances have posed serious chal-
lenges to European trade unions. Faced with declining membership and increasing
dependence on external funding, unions have sought new strategies to retain their
inuence in economic decision making. In several western European countries, this
resulted in increased institutionalization of unions combined with a rise in pro-
fessionalism of union leadership. This evolution calls for a strategic approach in
studies of strike occurrences, particularly when these strikes are targeted against
the government. Nowadays, union leaders have a clear view of the governments
room for maneuver and its vulnerability to strikes. Therefore, an empirical study of
strikes against the government should take into account that the start of an endur-
ing strike is a deliberate decision of forward-looking union leaders. In this paper,
we present a strategic model of trade union strikes against the government. Using
the statistical backwards induction methodology developed by Bas, Signorino and
Walkers (2008), we estimate the determinants of unionsand governments behav-
ior and payo¤s. We nd that governments are more susceptible to pressure when
their popularity is increasing and elections are near. In a strategic framework, this
nding is not irreconcilable with the observation that long-lasting conicts are more
likely to occur under these specic circumstances.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, European trade unions have been challenged profoundly by the
forces of economic internationalization and the decay of the traditional backbone of their
power, i.e. a homogenous working class. These forces have resulted in decreasing member-
ship statistics, and increased dependence on government funding (Visser, 2012). Despite
these problems, European trade unions are still crucial to the governance of European
economies. They are organized strategic actors speaking for a large and historically im-
portant social movement. Therefore, unionism in Europe is no relic from the past, and
it remains important to study how unions intervene in the policy making process and
defend the interests of their members.
Given the rapidly changing circumstances, European trade unions must constantly
make choices about their identities, their goals, and who their opponents and allies are.
They have managed to adapt themselves to the changing environment with varying suc-
cess. A common trend observed in several Western European countries (Belgium, France,
Italy, The Netherlands) is the professionalization of union leadership and management.
Until the early 1980s, these unions felt that their role was to support the spontaneous
actions of their members and to develop this action within the context of larger protests
against the government and against the employers (Slomp, 1998). Nowadays, activists
have been replaced by professional representatives who control cartels of non-grass-root
unions. Their goal is no longer to increase membership rates or encourage social mo-
bilization. Instead, trade unionsrepresentatives spend most of their time negotiating
with the government or employers organizations. These institutionalized unions are not
funded by their membership, but are heavily subsidized by the state, local authorities
and employers (Andolfatto and Labbé, 2012).
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of the change in organizational struc-
ture and professionalism with respect to the occurrence of strikes against the government.
We analyze data on all French strikes targeted against the government over the period
1988-1995. We use statistical backward induction, and provide evidence that unions do
not merely support spontaneous actions of their members, but rather demonstrate pro-
fessionalism in the strategic timing of enduring strikes. We show that the likelihood
of government concessions increases with the probability of reelection. However, strate-
gic behavior of union leaders can explain why we also observe more enduring conicts
(without concessions) when elections are near and government approval increases.
In the next section, we discuss the changing characteristics of French unionism in the
past decades. Like in many other European countries, French unions are coping with
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decreasing membership rates and changes in the system of representation. Furthermore,
unions funding channels have been modied thoroughly, and their relationship with
respect to the government and political parties changed considerably. In general, we
can say that unions are by now more institutionalized representative organizations that
display a high level of professionalism. This trend towards professional institutions that
maintain close relationships with the government and employers organizations has often
been used to explain the decrease in the number of industrial conicts. Others (e.g.
Martin, 2010) have pointed out that conict can often be avoided, because professional
unions only revert to industrial action when they reckon that they have a good chance
of getting the desired concessions. Our paper should be situated in the second line of
reasoning.
In the third section, we describe the data. We use data from four di¤erent sources,
which allows us to examine the relationship between strike activity, political approval
ratings and political and economic circumstances in detail.
The fourth section presents our empirical analysis. We use statistical backwards
induction to estimate which factors determine the strategic behavior of the government
and the unions. We focus on the e¤ect of electoral pressure on the governments choice
of action and on strike occurence. Furthermore, we present counterfactual analyses to
assess the impact of the quasi-constitutional power sharing arrangements for divided
governments.
We conclude that the government is more (less) likely to make concessions when its
popularity is increasing (decreasing) and elections are near. When elections are still far
away, the government is more likely to stand rm. Furthermore, we learn that if unions
take the governments expected reaction into account when deciding to initiate a longer
strike, our ndings should not be dismissed by the observed correlation between the
occurrence of enduring industrial conicts and weak governments.
2 The Professionalization of Union leadership in France.
In this section, we briey discuss how French unionism changed over the past decades.
The observed developments towards professionalism, bureaucratization and a top-down
decision-making process in matters of industrial action provide support for our claim that
strikes against the government should be modeled in a strategic fashion. Figure 1 displays
the density of unionization in France over the period 1949 2009. Between 1958 and
1978, more than a quarter of French workers were unionized. During these years of rapid
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Figure 1: Union Densities (1970-2010)
economic growth, the French workforce increased from 13 to 18 million and was pro-
foundly transformed and rejuvenated. The maintaining of the rate of unionization at the
same level indicates that there was a signicant increase in membership. In other words,
during the trente glorieuses, the French trade unions adapted themselves to changes
occurring in the labor market: the arrival of the baby boom generation, feminization of
the workforce, the rise of the service sectors and of the white collars. During this period,
the rate of unionization in France was lower than in Germany, in Scandinavian countries
and in Belgium, but it was comparable to that of North America and Italy, at least until
the early 1970s.
Until the early 1980s, the major activity of French trade union activists was to pro-
vide individual assistance to their members to protect them against dismissal, sanctions,
arbitrary transfers, bullying. These activists had to resolve many problems of everyday
life at work: poor working conditions, dangerous equipment, unsociable hours, refusal to
give holidays, unpaid premiums, etc. This assistance could extend beyond the workplace
to include help with housing problems, procedures with social security funds, etc. This
function of "legal defense and formulation of demands" has become unpopular among
political activists because it was time consuming, but it was nevertheless accepted by the
militants because it allowed to collect union dues and to gain members, sympathizers and
voters.
In 1975, the number of unionized workers was about 4.5 million, that is to say a union
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Union Number of members (2003)
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) 540 000
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) 450 000
Force Ouvrière (CGT-FO) 300 000
Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes (UNSA) 135 000
Fédération Syndicale Unitaire (FSU) 120 000
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC) 100 000
Confédération Générale des Cadres (CFE-CGC) 90 000
Union syndicale Solidaires (SUD) 80 000
Table 1: French Unions and Membership Rates
density (rate of unionization) of nearly 25 %. Not only were these members a physical
reality but they were loyal to their organization - their average seniority was over 10 years
- and a signicant minority were prepared to bring, in addition to its membership fees, a
voluntary contribution to some of their unionsactivities. At that time, much of the life
of trade unions relied on volunteer activists who gave dynamism and e¢ ciency to these
teams.
Between 1978 and 1988, the rate of unionization was halved, which means that very
many members left their unions while recruitment dried up. Subsequently in the 1990s
and 2000s, this decline continued without interruption, but at a slower pace. Despite
repeated assertions, this decline has not yet been halted.
In 2003, membership was only 1.7 to 1.9 million, that is to say around 7 % of the
total workforce of 23.5 million French workers. This is the lowest rate of all the OECD
countries, alongside with Turkey (Visser, 2011). Union members were shared among
seven main unions, as can be seen in Table 1.
These numbers tell only a part of the story. If we study these statistics in greater
detail, the changing nature of French unionism gets even more clear. For example, in 2003
two thirds of the union members were working in the public sector or in public companies.
In the private sector, less than one employee out of 20 is unionized. Furthermore, 13
percent of the union members are retirees. A nal observation is that a large part of
the remaining members devote more than halve of their working time to union activities.
These members are paid by their employers, but part of their salary stems from state or
local authoritiessubsidies. These observations may support the claim that unionism has
become much more professional over the past three decades.
The professionalism and institutionalization of French unions calls for a strategic ap-
proach in studies of strike occurrences. In comparison with the initiators of a spontaneous
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strike in a small factory, union leaders have a clear view of the governments room for
maneuver and its vulnerability to strikes. Therefore, an empirical study of strikes against
the government should take into account that the start of an enduring strike is a deliber-
ate decision of forward-looking union leaders. Before we describe our empirical approach,
we briey discuss the data.
3 Data
Our dataset comprises data from ve di¤erent sources. All data concerning the strikes
were obtained from the European Protest and Coercion Dataset, developed by Ron
Francisco at the University of Kansas (Francisco; 2000, 2011). This dataset consists of a
very extensive list of protests and repressive events such as strikes, occupations, riots, etc.
in 28 European countries from 1980 through 1995. We only use data on conicts between
unions or professional organizations and the government in France. The conicts must
have economic roots, i.e. a demand for wage increase or dissatisfaction with labor policy
or social policy. Furthermore, we only kept the events that were coded as a strike for at
least one day. Some of these events have additional qualications such as demonstration,
occupation or obstruction.
Data on union densities and total membership were obtained from Ebbinghaus and
Visser (2000). The concentration measures (Herndahl-Hirschman and C3 indices) as well
as the relative strength of the confederations of French unions within certain industries
were computed using the same dataset.
Approval rates for the French president and prime minister were obtained from the
website of professor Richard S. Conley. These data were originally collected for his
paper From Elysian Fields to the Guillotine? The Dynamics of Presidential and Prime
Ministerial Approval in Fifth Republic France.
The data on budget decits were collected from the website of the world bank.
Finally, data on political characteristics of the government (ideological dispersion of
the government, minority cabinet or minimum winning coalition, cohabitation, left or
right government) were obtained from the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Data
Archive (Strom, Müller and Bergman, 2008).
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4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we present a model of statistical backward induction to estimate the
determinants of unionsand the governments actions and utility levels during strikes.
Before we discuss the key model applied in this paper, we explore some prima facie
relationships between the governments popularity and the incidence of strikes.
4.1 Prima facie relationships between strike incidence and changes
in government popularity.
Table 2 describes how protest occurrence and changes in prime minister approval coincide
in our dataset. If we look at the aggregate number of strikes, we notice that the majority
strikes occur when the popularity of the prime minister is falling. This could indicate that
unions target governments when they are weak, i.e. when the government is losing support
from the population. On the other hand, this could also indicate that the government is
especially unpopular when it has to take harsh austerity measures or implement economic
reforms, and that these measures often induce a reaction from trade unions. Several
studies deal with the precise nature of this relationship (Boya, Malizard and Agamaliyev,
2010; Dubois, 2007; Gerstlé and François, 2011). When we distinguish between di¤erent
subcategories of industrial action, we see that more aggresive forms of protest happen
when prime minister populariry is increasing rather than decreasing. In the next section,
we take the analysis one step further, by distinguishing between strikes of a single day and
enduring strikes. While single day strikes may merely serve to express dissatisfaction with
government policies, costly enduring strikes will not be started without due consideration.
We therefore believe that the choice between a single day strike and an enduring strike
depends only on the perceived likelihood of obtaining concessions.
# observations % of observations with increasing PM popularity
All strikes 343 43.4
No extra pressure 217 44.2
Demonstrations 74 35.1
Obstructions 41 51.2
Occupations 11 81.8
Long strikes 117 56.4
Concessions 20 65.0
Table 2: Strikes and Changes in Prime Minister Popularity
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Several studies examine the often observed correlation between prolonged strikes or
protests and the response of strong and weak governments in detail (Tsebelis and Lange,
1995; Gerstlé and François, 2011; Vis, 2009, 2010). This paper contributes to the liter-
ature by studying this relationship in a strategic framework. If we believe that unions
do not benet from a long period of strikes that ends without getting concessions, it is
reasonable to assume that they will not start such a conict if they perceive the chance
of obtaining concessions to be limited. This introduces a selection bias that can only
be dealt with by imposing a strategic structure. In the next section, we investigate
whether popularity ratings a¤ect the probability of concessions, and how this translates
into outcomes given the unionsstrategic choice of action.
4.2 The game theoretic model and statistical backwards induc-
tion
Strategic interaction is a fundamental consideration when one wants to study the initi-
ation of and actorsconduct during strikes. Therefore, we apply a model of statistical
backwards induction. This model was developed by Muhammet Ali Bas, Curtis Signorino
and Robert Walker (2008).
In this section, we present the game tree and the structural model. Next, we discuss
the determinants of unionsand governmentspayo¤s in each of the three outcomes. We
conclude this section by presenting the results of our estimations.
The interplay between trade unions and governments that precedes economic policy-
making is a very complex process. Both partiespositions may change over time, demands
or o¤ers may be made behind the scenes and threaths may or may not be carried out.
Furthermore, a partys choice of action may be motivated by elements that go beyond the
specic conicted policy at hand. Following a breach of trust in the recent past, unions
may seize the opportunity of rising tensions to settle old scores. If mutual trust has
recently been rea¢ rmed on the other hand, unions may be more acquiescent in subsequent
disputes. In short, the true game played by unions and governments is dynamic and
extremely complex. On top of that, the actual course of play often remains conceiled
from the researchers eyes. All these elements pose serious challenges to the identication
and disentanglement of the forces at work in this process. In this paper, we narrow our
focus to a specic part of the process, i.e. those situations in which some form of industrial
action can no longer be avoided. We model their interaction as a one-shot game. Although
we may ignore important aspects of the overarching game, we believe that uncovering the
strategies of governments and unions in this sub-game is crucial to our understanding of
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Figure 2: The Strike Game in Extensive Form.
the bigger picture of government-union interaction. In one way or another, the players
strategies in preceding stages (e.g. the governments decision on whether or not to consult
the unions, the unions decision on whether or not to end negotiations, etc.) are all based
on their respective assessments of the eventual consequences of an open conict.
Figure 2 presents the strike game in its extensive form. Prior to the beginning of
the game, union members have informed their leaders that they are willing to strike to
express their discontent with the state of a¤airs. The object of their dissatisfaction may
be a proposed policy reform, a change in working conditions or the lack of government
protection against deteriorating economic conditions. The union leaders cannot perfectly
estimate the true willingness to strike of all union members, let alone of all a¤ected
workers. We assume that the noisy signal from the union members is strong enough to
justify at least a single day of industrial action. However, the union leaders still have
to decide whether they will limit the strike to a single day or not. A strike of a single
day is usually announced beforehand, and all a¤ected parties know that its duration is
predetermined. It could therefore be considered as an expression of discontent or at most
as a threat to fully engage in a strike conict later on, rather than a ultimate exacerbation
of an ongoing conict (Lancaster, 1972). When unions enter the second day of a strike,
they convey to the government that they are willing to engage in a conict with an
uncertain outcome. In the second stage, the government decides whether or not it will
make concessions to the strikers. If concessions are made, the game ends in an agreement.
If not, the strike will eventually end.
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4.2.1 Structural model
The structural model is rather simple. Because the government observes the unions
action, this is a fully recursive model. If we assume that there is no incomplete information
about utilities, neither for the players nor for the researcher, the game can be solved by
backwards induction for any given specication of the utilities. However, if there is a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium for any particular specication of utilities, the above
model is not statistical. A statistical analysis requires a probability model that puts
positive probability on all the outcomes (Signorino, 2001). This can be done by assuming
that players make mistakes in their actions, that they misperceive each others utilities
or that we as analysts have to deal with measurement error or regressor misspecication
(Signorino, 2003).
In our analysis, we assume that each players utility has a private random component.
The true value of this component is only known by the player in question, the other
player and the analyst only know its distribution.
The governments utilities from making concessions and standing rm are, respec-
tively:
UGov(mc) = UGov(mc) + mc = UGov(C) + mc
UGov(sf) = UGov(sf) + sf = UGov(ES) + sf ,
where UGov() is the true utility, UGov() is the part of the utility that is observable
to the union and to the analyst, and a is a random component of utility which is only
observable to the government. We assume that the government maximizes its true utility.
As analysts, we can only derive choice probabilities if we make assumptions about the
distribution of the private components of utility. We assume that this distribution is Type
I Extreme Value, which results in logit probabilities. More specically, the probability
that the government will make concessions or stand rm are:
pmc =
eUGov(C)
eUGov(C)+eUGov(ES)
and pmc = e
UGov(ES)
eUGov(C)+eUGov(ES)
, respectively.
We now turn to the unions decision to strike a single day or to start an industrial
conict. If the union strikes a single day, the game ends. The decision to start an
industrial conict however, depends on the predicted action of the government. The
unions utilities are hence:
UUnion(short) = UUnion(short) + short = UUnion(IS) + short
UUnion(long) = EUUnion(long) + long
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= pmcUUnion(C) + psfUUnion(ES) + long
We assume that we as researchers have the same uncertainty as the players. Again, we
assume that the private component of the unions utility is distributed Type I Extreme
Value. As a result, the probabilities of the union calling a short or a long strike are logit
probabilities. However, these probabilities do not take the typical logit form, because
they are based on expected utility calculations. The unions probability of calling a short
or a long strike are respectively:
pshort=
eUunion(short)
eUUnion(short)+eEUUnion(long)
= e
Uunion(short)
eUUnion(short)+e
pmcUUnion(C)+psfUUnion(ES)
plong=
eUunion(long)
eUUnion(short)+eEUUnion(long)
= e
pmcUUnion(C)+psfUUnion(ES)
eUUnion(short)+e
pmcUUnion(C)+psfUUnion(ES)
The equilibrium probabilities of the strategic model are hence (pshort; plong; pmc; psf ).
Given that we assume that the uncertainty comes from Type I extreme value perturba-
tions to the action utilities, the above equilibrium is a Logit Quantal Response Equilib-
rium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998; Signorino, 1999; Bas et al., 2007). Because we assume
that these perturbations are independently distributed, we can calculate outcome prob-
abilities by multiplying the action probabilities along the path of play. The outcome
probabilities are thus:
Pr(IS) = pshort
Pr(ES) = plong  psf
Pr(C) = plong  pmc
Let us now specify the system of latent variable equations on which we build our
empirical analysis. We observe the choice of action of the players, and assume that
yunion =
n
1; if UUnion(long)UUnion(short)
0; if UUnion(long)<U

Union(short)
yGov =
n
1; if UGov(mc)UGov(sf)
0; if UGov(mc)<U

Gov(sf)
where yunion = 1 and yGov = 1 correspond to the union choosing a long strike and
the government choosing to make concessions. The equilibrium action probabilities can
hence be written as plong = Pr(yUnion = 1) and pmc = Pr(yGov = 1):
The system of latent variables underlying our empirical model can now be specied
as:
yUnion = U

Union(long)  UUnion(short),
yGov = U

Gov(mc)  UGov(sf);
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with yj = 1 if yj  0 and yj  0 if yj < 0; for j 2 fUnion;Govg.
The above model is just a strategic random utility model. Once we assign regressors
to the utilities of both players, we can estimate action and outcome probabilities using
maximum likelihood estimation. Before we specify the regressors, it will be helpful to
derive the analytical form of the coe¢ cients using a system with a single parameter and
regressor. Let the unions utility under the three di¤erent outcomes be specied as:
Uunion;IS = 1 + 1X1
Uunion;ES = 2 + 1X1
Uunion;C = 3 +  1X1
After normalization, we get:
Uunion;IS   Uunion;IS = 0
Uunion;ES   Uunion;IS = (2   1) + (1   1)X1
Uunion;C   Uunion;IS = (3   1) + ( 1   1)X1
The union will choose for a long strike if
(1  bpmc)(Uunion;ES   Uunion;IS) + bpmc(Uunion;C   Uunion;IS)  0,
where bpmc is the observed probability that the government will make concessions
Given the above specications, the unions decision rule can be written as:
[1   1   bpmc (1    1)]X1 + (1  bpmc)2 + bpmc3   1
The coe¢ cient of X1 is [(1  bpmc)1 + bpmc 1   1] : In order to facilitate interpreta-
tion, we have to make additional assumptions about 1; 1 and/or  1. Luckily, these
assumptions are often very reasonable. If a regressor is only relevant for one outcome,
we can safely assume that the other parameters are equal to zero. In our analysis for
example, the size or nature of the benets from concessions will only a¤ect the unions
utility once these concessions have been made. For these regressors, we hence assume
that 1 = 1 = 0. As a result, the coe¢ cient simplies to bpmc 1, which means that we can
estimate  1 if we multiply X1 by bpmc. In other instances, it makes sense to assume that
the parameters are identical in two outcomes. For instance, there may be costs related
to a long strike that are independent of the governments response. For variables related
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to such costs, we assume that 1 = 0 and 1 =  1. In this case, the coe¢ cient of X1 is
equal to 1 and  1.
4.2.2 Payo¤s
The distinction between a strike of a single day and a longer strike is particularly relevant
when we model the payo¤s of union leaders. Assuming that their members call for
action is strong enough to justify at least a one day strike, the union leaders do not
jeopardize their position by announcing such a strike. They are certain that their call
will be supported by their members, and hence do not risk losing face because of an
unsuccessful mobilization. When the true level of worker dissatisfaction is high enough
to warrant a longer strike, the union leaders can present their decision as a warning for
the counterparty and engage in longer strikes later. By calling out an enduring strike on
the other hand, union leaders are putting themselves in a risky position. If they obtain
concessions from the government, they increase the utility of their members as well as
their own, and reinforce their position as leaders of the trade union. If the strike ends
in failure, either because the union leaders underestimated the governments rmness or
because they overestimated the support of their members, the leaders positions within
the unions may be compromised.
The strategic aspects of strikes are often overlooked, because most studies consider
strikes as the result of misinformation. In these models, the actors simply try to inform the
adversary about their utilities as good and as quickly as possible. Tsebelis (1993) notes
that there is no obvious reason why this should be how rational actors would behave. In
fact, the implicit conception of the actors seems both naïve and to contradict the notion
of the rational maximizer that underlies the deductive logic of all these theories. (. . . ) We
need to treat incomplete information as a resource, and not just as a limitation(Tsebelis,
1993, p.141). Our focus on the choice between a strike of a single day and an extended
strike, allows us to study the strategic behavior of union leaders and the determinants
of the payo¤s of both parties in a simple game theoretic framework. These questions
cannot be studied if we would model the bargaining process as an innitely repeated
game. The only assumption we have to make is that once union leaders have decided
to start an extended strike, they will only call it o¤ when memberssupport decreased
below a particular level. In other words, once the choice for a longer strike is made, the
union leaders fate is in the hands of the government and the union members. If the
government makes concessions, they will triumph. If no concessions are made before the
union members retreat their support, they will lose face. They cannot, however, secure a
higher level of utility for themselves by calling of the strike before support has run out.
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We now turn to the payo¤s of the government. The governments main concern is that
it wants to be reelected. The more it fears that strikes may jeopardize this reelection, the
more it will be willing to make concessions. Reelection prospects depend on the evolution
of government approval and the time to the next elections. The independent variable that
we use to capture the pressure on governments with respect to reelection prospects, is
based on the electoral option modeldeveloped by Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997).
The electoral option model is based on a measure that allows us to calculate reelection
probabilities from polling results while taking the remaining time until the next elections
into account. If the next elections will take place in the distant future, there is a strong
chance that the polls will change or that previous changes in polling results will be
reversed. The parties in o¢ ce should therefore attach less importance to these polls the
further they are from the next elections. The measure of Alesina et al. (1997) is expressed
as:
PrRt = 
h
QRt +m 50

p
m
i
where  is the cumulative standard normal distribution, QRt denotes the proportion
of citizens who intend to vote for the party in o¢ ce relative to those who intend to
vote for the other party at time t, and m is the number of days until the election.  is
the sample mean of changes in this proportion, and  is the sample standard deviation
of daily changes. This measure is not appropriate for our analysis however, because it
is developed for a two party system. Furthermore, we are not interested in predicting
the outcome of the next elections and we do not need to express reelection prospects
as a percentages. Because our variable is only meant to capture the pressure on the
parties in o¢ ce from reelection prospects and electoral fever, we can use a much simpler
specication. This specication is simply the change in approval ratings over the past
two months divided by the number of days until the next election.
The literature is still inconclusive on the question whether a strong or a weak polit-
ical position makes it more probable that the government will withstand protests. The
traditional view suggests that a strong position facilitates pushing through unpopular re-
forms (Garett, 1993; Keeler, 1993; Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi, 2006). However, when
it comes to large-scale reforms such as changes in the pension system this view is not
supported by the data. Vis (2010, p.134) observes that
In almost all instances of unpopular reform, the government faces a deteri-
orating socio-economic situation (. . . ) or a weakening political position (e.g.
a fall in the polls).
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To explain this observation, she applies the key empirical ndings of prospect theory
to political decision-making. Prospect theory was developed by Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky (1979, 1981, 2000) and deals with decision-making under uncertainty.
Compared to expected utility theory, prospect theory o¤ered a more accurate description
of decision processes. The key empirical nding of prospect theory is that people are risk
averse when they face favorable prospects, but tend towards risk acceptance when they
face a deteriorating situation. Vis (2009, 2010) uses the insights of prospect theory to
study welfare reforms in four European countries between 1979 and 2005. Her fuzzy-set
qualitative comparative analysis provides evidence that a weakening political position of
government parties combined with a deteriorating socio-economic situation are su¢ cient
conditions to push through unpopular reforms. Conversely, if the political and economic
climate is favorable to the parties in o¢ ce, they will shy away from adopting risky reforms.
Compared to Vis(2009) study, we focus on political decisions with a narrow impact.
However, the insights from prospect theory are also relevant for the conicts that we
study. When the government chooses not to concede it runs the risk of being associated
with social unrest, which decreases its chances of winning the next elections. Making
concessions to strikers is arguably the less risky option. In this case prospect theory
predicts that governments are more likely to make concessions when approval ratings are
increasing.
This prediction can also be explained by an argument that does not entail di¤erence
in risk aversion. When the governments popularity is increasing and elections are near,
it may pay to make concessions in order to shift the medias attention away from the
frustrated workers and back to more popular policies. If popularity is decreasing, the
benets from such a shift are smaller, because the focus of attention will be moved to
other but perhaps equally unpopular policies. Furthermore, the reversal of the contested
policy is more likely to be considered as a sign of weakness if the government is already
in a weak position (reference needed).
Losing an election is not the only way in which a government may lose o¢ ce. If the
government is internally instable, the likelihood that social unrest induces a political cri-
sis increases. Furthermore, unions are more likely to nd an ally within the government
when this government is ideologically dispersed. Therefore, we expect that instable gov-
ernments are more likely to make concessions when unions engage in an extended strike.
Finally, concessions have a budgetary cost that should be taken into account. The extent
of this cost depends on the specic issue. Regardless of the exact amount, the government
will be more likely to make concessions when it is less restricted by budgetary concerns.
The union leaderspayo¤s depend on the utility of union members and the security
of their position within the organization. The unionsmembers and leaders have the
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Concept Variable
Utility union leaders Wage loss Service sector
(concessions) Net gains Non-excludable benets
Wage loss Service sector
Utility union leaders Damage to reputation / leadership Net density
(conictual strike) HH concentration index
C3-index
Electoral impact PM   approval
#days until election
PR  app  Cohab
Utility government #days until election
(concessions) Stability of government Cohabitation
Disruptive potential Share Force Ouvrière
Share CFDT
C3- index
HH concentration index
Cost of concessions Budget Surplus
Table 3: Determinants of the PlayersUtilities.
same preference ordering over the three outcomes: They prefer government concessions
to an informative strike, and an informative strike to conictual strike. As noted above,
announcing a strike for a single day is the safer option. The payo¤s of a one day strike
are certain, and independent of the governments strategy. Therefore, we will normalize
these payo¤s to zero in our empirical analysis below, and compare the payo¤s of the other
two outcomes to those of the informative strike.
Irrespective of the governments response, workers lose (part of) their income during
strikes. The larger this loss, the less likely it should be that unions engage in enduring
strikes. The monetary loss depends on a large number of factors such as economic sector
competitiveness, wage levels, collective bargaining agreements and even seasons, and is
therefore hard to include in an empirical analysis.
For our empirical analysis of strikes against the government in France between 1988
and 1995, we use the following variables as determinants of the payo¤s:
As discussed above, the union leaderspayo¤s in the event of an informative strike
are normalized to zero. Their most preferred outcome is concessions. The payo¤s
will depend positively on the net gains from the concessions made by the government.
These will be larger when the concessions exclusively benet the members of the union
in question and the workers who took part in the strike. If this is not the case, the union
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members might have enjoyed the same benets without incurring the costs from taking
part in the strike. On a more psychological or organizational level, the union leaders
position will be stronger if successfully secures the specic interests of the union members.
The largest cost of an enduring strike is the loss of income. In France, the loss of income
is smaller in the service sector due to national labor legislation. We will therefore include
a binary variable indicating whether the strike takes place in the service sector.
The payo¤s of union leaders in a conictual strike consist of income loss and reputa-
tional damage. The reputational damage depends of the perceived share of responsibility
for the failure that can be attributed to the union leader. If there are several unions
in the sector, and if only a small percentage of the workers are union members, it is
easier for the leaders to blame someone else for the failure. In our analysis, we use three
di¤erent variables to capture the reputational damage: the net density, or the percent-
age of unionized workers in the sector; the Herndahl-Hirschman concentration index, or
the sum of squared union-shares in the sector; and the C-3 concentration index, or the
aggregate share of the 3 largest unions in the sector.
The payo¤s of the French government in the outcome conictual strikeare normalized
to zero. The payo¤s in the event of concessions depend on the electoral impact of the
strike, internal stability of the government, the disruptive potential of the strike and its
budgetary cost. Despite the strong position of the president in the French fth republic,
economic and social a¤airs are usually considered to be part of the competence of the
prime minister. Many scholars argue that when economic conditions deteriorate, the
French prime minister is often used as a scapegoat by the president (Lewis-Beck, 1980;
Capron, 1987). A recent empirical study by Boya, Malizard and Agamaliyev (2010)
conrm this. Therefore, strikes and protests are often targeted at the prime minister.
This is even more clear when the president and the prime minister belong to di¤erent
political parties. In these so-called periods of cohabitation, an unwritten rule prohibits the
president to interfere with internal economic and social a¤airs. A study of pilot surveys
conducted by Lewis-Beck (1997) conrms that in periods of cohabitation, the voters hold
the prime minister accountable for economic a¤airs. However, when legislative elections
approach, an increase in the popularity of the president may put pressure on the prime
minister. In periods of cohabitation, we therefore also include the change in presidential
approval as a determinant of the governments payo¤s.
The stability of a cabinet may inuence its likelihood to make concessions to protesters.
In our analysis, the internal stability of government is proxied by the binary variable Co-
habitation.
The disruptive potential of the strike depends on the unions ability to get media
coverage, to disrupt normal economic activities, and to win the support of the general
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Variables N mean St. Dev. min max
Budget Surplus 343 -4.007 1.305 -6.152 -1.903
Prime Minister Approval 343 0.000379 0.0606 -0.667 0.500
Pr. Approval in Cohabitation 343 -0.00725 0.0509 -0.412 0.0952
Service Sector 343 0.274 0.447 0 1
Net Density 343 9.264 0.633 8.600 10.70
Share Force Ouvrière 343 0.209 0.0566 0.00800 0.269
Share CFDT 343 0.241 0.135 0 0.554
C3-Index 343 0.811 0.0993 0.239 0.902
HH-index 343 0.281 0.0549 0.214 0.563
Table 4: Table Caption
public. In our analysis, we use 4 di¤erent variables that relate to the unions capacity
to put the government under pressure. The rst two are the share of the most militant
union Force Ouvrièreand the share of the most cooperative union CFDTin the sector
in question. The third and fourth variable measure the concentration of syndical power.
We assume that concentration of power facilitates disruptive industrial action or at least
poses a larger and more credible threat. Concentration is measured via the Herndahl-
Hirschman index and the C3-index which we discussed earlier.
As argued above, it is di¢ cult to obtain reliable estimates of the budgetary costs of
concessions. In our analysis, we use the budget surplus that was realized in the year the
strike ended (with or without concessions).
4.2.3 Results
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis below.
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We start by analyzing the governments decision in the nal stage. Because the
governments decision to make concessions or not is the nal action in the game, we use
a logit model to estimate the determinants of the latent variable, i.e. the governments
utility. The results are presented in Table 5. Out of 117 long strikes, 20 ended with
concessions made by the government. Therefore, we also estimate this stage with Gary
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(1) (2) (3)
Government
Concessions
Government
Concessions
Government
Concessions
PrimeMinister Ap-
proval
93.47* 96.18* 95.30*
(1.65) (1.89) (1.77)
Cohabitation 1.353* 1.370** 1.240*
(1.88) (2.00) (1.82)
Budget Surplus 0.571** 0.493* 0.542**
(2.02) (1.85) (1.99)
President Approval
During Cohabita-
tion
-19.53* -16.09 -17.81
(-1.67) (-1.22) (-1.54)
Share Force Ou-
vrière
25.58**
(2.00)
Share CFDT 2.174
(0.46)
C3-index 2.960
(0.80)
HH concentration-
index
-13.74
(-1.44)
Constant -6.854** -3.151 3.192
(-2.09) (-0.97) (1.16)
Observations 106 106 106
Table 5: Regression Results Final Stage
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Kings rare-event logit model (King, 2001). Because this approach does not produce
signicantly di¤erent results, we include the results in the appendix.
We see that the government is more (less) likely to make concessions when the prime
ministers popularity is increasing (decreasing), especially when on the verge of legislative
elections. Interestingly, it does not matter whether the incumbent government is leftwing
or rightwing. We interpret this as an indication that the parties in o¢ ce do not expect
to win votes based on their response to the unionsactions. Even rightwing governments
that are gaining popularity prefer to settle the issue by means of concessions, rather than
taking a rm stance in the hope of being rewarded by their electorate. As an incumbent
government, being associated with industrial conict will never pay o¤ at the ballots,
regardless of the ideological orientation of their supporters.
If conict deteriorates reelection prospects, then why should the governments willing-
ness to make concessions depend on whether approval ratings are increasing or decreasing?
First of all, changes in popularity a¤ect the expected benets of getting the conict of
the table. Close to elections, the governing parties will try to direct the publics attention
towards those policies that proved to be popular. Increasing popularity ratings indicate
that the governments positions on the other political issues with media coverage at that
time, are on average well received by the public. Therefore, the probability that the me-
dias attention shifts away from the settled conict towards policies with a lot of popular
support increases when approval ratings are on the rise. When popularity is decreasing
the benets from settling the conict will be smaller, because it is still likely that the
media will shift their focus to another unpopular issue.
Furthermore, unions have a higher chance of getting concessions when the budget
decit is small and when they are in a period of cohabitation (possibly due to a lower
level of internal stability in the government). The e¤ect of changes in the presidents
popularity in times of cohabitation has the expected sign, and has a signicant impact
on the governments decision to make concessions or not. Finally, the share of the industry
occupied by the militant union Force Ouvrièrehas a signicant positive impact on the
likelihood that the government will make concessions. The share of the CDFG on the
other hand, has no e¤ect, even though this union has/had close connections with the
Socialist Party. The industry share of both unions has a similar e¤ect on government
concessions during leftwing and rightwing governments.
We nd no evidence for Tsebelis(1995) hypothesis that the unionsdegree of dis-
persion (or concentration) is an important determinant of success in bargaining with the
government in times of industrial conict. Neither the Hirschman Herndahl nor the
C3- concentration index a¤ects the governments decision with respect to concessions
signicantly.
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To estimate the determinants of unions utility in the rst stage, we multiply the
respective payo¤ variables with the predicted probability that the government will make
concessions (or not). The income loss incurred during the strike does not depend on the
governments response. Therefore, we include it in the payo¤s of the outcomes agree-
ment as well as conict. The benets of concessions however, can only be enjoyed
when the government chooses to make concessions. The reputational damage of union
leaders on the other hand, should only occur when the government does not make con-
cessions. Therefore, we multiply these variables with the predicted probability that the
government will concede or will not concede, respectively. These predicted probabilities
are based on the value of all the determinants of the governments response in the second
stage.
Table 6 presents the results of logit models of the unions decision in the rst stage.
Because the variables have been transformed using predicted probabilities of the second
stage, distributional assumptions of logit models are no longer fullled. If we were to
use logit to estimate this strategic model, our parameter estimates would be biased and
inconsistent (Signorino and Yilmaz, 2003). Curtis Signorino (1999, 2002, 2003) devel-
oped a method to deal with these issues. Using his system estimator the parameters of
the entire model are all estimated simultaneously, which results in unbiased and consis-
tent estimates. Bas, Signorino and Walker (2008) provide an alternative technique to
estimate recursive statistical strategic models. Because listwise deletion of missing obser-
vations in the system-approach resulted in a needless loss of data, we used Bas, Signorino
and Walkers (2008) method. The procedure consists of estimating the recursive system
equation-by-equation, thereby using a form of nonparametric bootstrap to calculate the
standard errors of the unions parameter estimates. Because the unions choice of action
depends on the expected choice of the government, a correction for the presence of a ran-
dom action probability is necessary. This correction is not necessary for the parameter
estimates of the governments choice.
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The independent variables are all signicant and have the expected sign. Because
the loss of income is lower in the service sector, the unions are less reluctant to start
an enduring strike. If potential concessions will benet the general public or a group
considerably larger than the workers of a specic industry, the expected utility of an
enduring strike decreases. The reputational damage associated with losing the conict
will be higher if the leadership of the striking unions is concentrated. When this is the
case, the expected utility of enduring strikes decreases and union leaders will be more
inclined to limit industrial action to a single day.
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(1) (2) (3)
Extended
Strike
Extended
Strike
Extended
Strike
Non-Excludable
Benets
-3.885* -4.039* -3.824*
(-1.88) (-1.93) (-1.88)
Service Sector 0.621* 0.527* 0.641**
(1.96) (1.73) (2.01)
Net Density
Unions
-0.0649***
(-3.63)
HH concentration-
index
-1.982***
(-3.62)
C3-index -0.755***
(-3.67)
Observations 277 277 277
Table 6: Regression Results First Stage
4.3 Electoral pressure, power sharing arrangements and strike
occurrence.
In this nal section we study how short term political forces and quasi-constitutional
power sharing arrangements a¤ect action and outcome probabilities in our game of strikes
against the government. First, we analyze the impact of electoral pressure on strike
occurence in depth, thereby fully exploiting the strategic nature of our model. Next, we
investigate whether alternative arrangements regarding the division of power in periods
of cohabitation would increase or decrease the number of enduring strikes.
4.3.1 The e¤ect of electoral pressure.
In the previous section, we found that electoral pressure increases the likelihood that the
government is prepared to make concessions. This nding comes with two important
caveats. First, the e¤ect of electoral pressure on the governments choice of action is
not necessarily linear, and it depends on the value of the other covariates. Second, it
is important to distinguish between action probabilities and outcome probabilities. An
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increase in the probability that the government will make concessions (action) does not
necessarily translate into a decrease in the number of enduring strikes (outcome).
Figure 3 illustrates how electoral pressure a¤ects the predicted action probability
that the government will make concessions, and the predicted outcome probability of
concessions.. Because the marginal e¤ects of approval ratings on the governments utility
depend on the values of the covariates, we study three di¤erent situations. In the high risk
low cost case, the disruptive potential of the strikes is large and budgetary restrictions
are loose. We approximate this situation by xing the share of the militant union Force
Ouvrière at the 90th percentile of its distribution and xing the budget surplus at the
10th percentile. In the low risk high cost case, the covariates are set at their 10th and
90th percentile respectively. In the baseline case, all covariates are set at their means. We
see that decreasing approval ratings have a limited e¤ect on the governmentspredicted
action. In the low risk case, the e¤ects are negligible. When approval ratings are on the
rise, the probability that the government will make concessions increases considerably.
However, the disruptive potential of the strike and budgetary restrictions can reinforce
or moderate the impact substantially. It is worth noting that the predicted probability
of concessions as an outcome is not a¤ected by approval ratings to the same extent. This
is due to the fact that the outcome depends both on the unions decision and on the
governments response.
Figure 4 depicts predicted outcome probabilities of industrial conict and illustrates
that strategic models can broaden our understanding of the occurrence of prolonged
protests.
First of all, we observe that industrial conicts are more likely to occur when disrup-
tive potential is large and budgetary restrictions are not too tight. Second, the dashed
line indicates that in the high risk low cost case the probability of an industrial conict
increases with approval ratings. The factors that increase the likelihood that the govern-
ment will make concessions will under some circumstances result in more, and not less
enduring conicts. Both ndings can be explained as the result of the strategic behavior
of unions. If the unions perceive their chances of obtaining concessions to be limited,
they will not take the risk of starting a prolonged strike. If they believe they have a fair
chance of winning the conict, they will be more willing to engage in an enduring strike.
To clarify this point, it is useful to write down the probability of conict explicitly.
The outcome probability of an enduring conict is:
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Figure 3: Predicted Action Probabilities: Concessions.
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Figure 4: Predicted Outcome Probabilities: Enduring Strike.
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Pr(Conflict) = Pr(ActionUnion = LongStrikejCircumstances)Pr(ActionGovernment =
StandFirmjLongStrike; Circumstances)
If the increase in the number long strikes started by the unions outweighs the increase
in the likelihood that the government will make concessions, the number of enduring
industrial conicts will rise. If we would study which factors a¤ect the likelihood of
enduring conict without taking the strategic behavior of the unions into account, we
might nd that the popularity of the government increases the likelihood of prolonged
strikes. However, it would be wrong to deduct from this nding that strong governments
are less susceptible to unionsthreats of prolonged conict. Our model shows that they
are more susceptible to threats, but that the strategic behavior of union leaders can lead
to an increased probability that these threats will have to be carried out.
4.3.2 Power sharing arrangements under cohabitation.
The sharing of budgetary powers between the president and the prime minister varies
considerably in semi-presidential systems. Lienert (2005) compares the budgetary au-
thority of the legislatures in presidential, semi-presidential and Westminster forms of
government1, and concludes that di¤erences between countries with a semi-presidential
system are at least as great as the di¤erences across di¤erent forms of government. Most
countries with a semi-presidential system confer the right to introduce the nance bill
to the legislature to the prime minister (Choudhry and Stacey, 2013)2. However, the
exclusive right of legislative initiative in budgetary matters does not completely shield
the prime minister from presidential interference. In semi-presidential systems, there are
many ways in which the president can limit the prime ministers budgetary room for
maneuver. For instance, the president may have inuence on central bank policies, or
may have the authority to set long-term spending limits.
In France, power sharing in budgetary policy is particularly relevant when the presi-
dent and prime minister belong to di¤erent political parties. In these periods of cohabita-
tion, the presidents power is limited to the so-called "domain réservé". Budgetary power
and responsibilty are part of the "domain surveillé", which means that in normal times the
president can exercise limited control on these issues. In times of cohabitation however, a
1A presidential systems, the head of government is also head of state and leads an executive branch
that is separate from the legislative branch. In parliamentary systems fashioned after the Westminster
system, the prime minister is the presiding and actual head of the government. Because he or she is
usually also a member of parliament, the prime minister is expected to ensure the passage of bills through
the legislature. In semi-presidential systems, a popularly elected xed term president exists alongside a
prime minister and Cabinet who are responsible to the legislature of a state.
2Exceptions are Peru ans Senegal, where the president has the legislative initiative over budgetary
matters.
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Actual Outcomes Pred. Outcomes Strong Pres. Ceremonial Pres.
Inf. Strike 207 248 243 253
End. Strike 116 90 84 87
Concessions 20 5 16 3
Table 7: Counterfactual Analyses
quasi-constitutional custom prohibits presidential interference in budgetary matters. In
this nal section, we investigate whether di¤erent power sharing arrangements between
a president and prime minister from di¤erent political parties would increase or decrease
the number of enduring industrial conicts.
Given that the president is responsible for the implementation of international treaties,
the ultimate budgetary responsibility has been the object of discussion when the Stability
and Growth Pact entered into force. The disagreement about the budgetary competence
was soon settled in favor of the prime minister. In our rst counterfactual situation,
the president remains responsible for the budget in a situation of divided government.
We approximate this situation by setting the coe¢ cient of the budget decit to zero in
periods of cohabitation. As we see in the fourth column of Table 7, our counterfactual
analysis predicts that the unions would choose for a long strike more often. The number
of enduring conicts would decrease however, because the government is more likely to
make concessions. The counterfactual budgetary responsibility of the president hence
seems to create a third-party payment problem. Despite the predicted decrease in the
number of enduring industrial conicts, the separation of decision-making and budgetary
responsibility is not an advisable alternative. In this regard, the French power sharing
arrangement is in line with the expression "qui paie les violons, peut choisir la musique"3.
In the second counterfactual situation, the president has a mere ceremonial role.
The government is entirely independent, and even in times of cohabitation presidential
popularity does not a¤ect political pressure on the government. Furthermore, the partisan
a¢ liation of the president does not indicate whether or not the government is stable. In
other words, cohabitation itself has become irrelevant to the day-to-day functioning of the
government, and therefore no longer implies a "divided government". We approximate
this situation by setting the coe¢ cient of the variables cohabitation and presidential
approval to zero. The results are presented in the fth column of Table 7. We see
that unions engage in long strikes less often. Because an asymmetric party political
composition of the executive power does not make the cabinet prone to internal pressure
3"He who pays the piper calls the tune."
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or instability, the government will no longer seek refuge in concessions to safeguard its
continuity. Union leaders realize this, and will choose to avoid an open conict more
often.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied union strikes against the government in a strategic setting.
A central question in studies of general strikes and protests against the government,
is whether the government is more likely to make concessions when its popularity is
decreasing or increasing. So far, the literature remains inconclusive.
Our paper contributes to the literature by imposing a strategic structure to the em-
pirical analysis. Unlike previous studies, we take into account that the union leaders are
forward looking. This assumption is justied by the observation that union leadership
is characterized by a rising level of professionalism, and that unions have close connec-
tions with political institutions. Therefore, union leaders are well equipped to assess the
adequacy of engaging in an open conict with the government at a certain time. This
means that they will avoid an enduring confrontation if they believe that the likelihood
of obtaining concessions is too small. If we do not impose a game theoretic structure, our
analysis would therefore su¤er from a selection bias.
Using data on all strikes against the government between 1988 and 1995, we nd
that governments are more likely to make concessions when elections are near and their
popularity is increasing. Vis (2009, 2010) explains a similar nding using key insights
from prospect theory. She argues that like individuals, governments are more risk averse
when they have optimistic prospects on the future. We o¤er an alternative explanation
by taking media attention into account. Our results also indicate that governments take
the obstructive potential of the strikers into account, and are hence more susceptible to
pressure when the most militant unions have a large share in the industry.
By introducing forward looking unions, we o¤er an explanation for the observation
that long lasting conicts often occur when elections are close and the parties in o¢ ce are
doing well at the polls. Paradoxically, these are precisely the circumstances under which
governments are more likely to make concessions. Because strategic behavior of union
leaders can lift this paradox, we believe that our strategic model presents an interesting
renement on the existent literature.
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